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Abstract
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental and ubiq-
uitous managerial function, typically involving several objectives and
a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence
of this task in practice, the process is seldom approached as a precise
optimization problem over the reported preferences of all agents. This
is due in part to the underlying computational complexity that occurs
when quadratic (i.e., intra-team interpersonal) interactions are taken
into consideration, and also due to game-theoretic considerations, when
those taking part in the process are self-interested agents. Variants of
this fundamental decision problem arise in a number of settings, includ-
ing, for example, human resources and project management, military
platooning, sports-league management, ride sharing, data clustering,
and in assigning students to group projects. In this paper, we study a
mathematical-programming approach to “team formation” focused on
the interplay between two of the most common objectives considered
in the related literature: economic efficiency (i.e., the maximization
of social welfare) and game-theoretic stability (e.g., finding a core so-
lution when one exists). With a weighted objective across these two
goals, the problem is modeled as a bi-level binary optimization prob-
lem, and transformed into a single-level, exponentially sized binary
integer program. We then devise a branch-cut-and-price algorithms
and demonstrate its efficacy through an extensive set of simulations,
with favorable comparisons to other algorithms from the literature.
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1 Introduction
Consider the task of assigning n workers to m teams of equal size (assume
that m evenly divides n). Each worker scores each co-worker, being asked
to express an integer from 1 to (say) 10, with 10 being a most preferred
teammate.
Through the application of constraints, it is easy to imagine many prac-
tical variations of this basic setting. For example, perhaps there are m
project managers among the n workers, and each team must have exactly
one project manager. Each project manager is tied to a specific project plan,
and workers consider the two together in their scoring. Variations with more
constraints (e.g., at least one marketing person, at least two from IT, etc.)
abound.
This process of putting people into teams and observing their satisfac-
tion (or lack thereof) happens incredibly frequently in practice, yet obtaining
maximum-score solutions for even modestly sized instances can be compu-
tationally prohibitive. Indeed, the maximization of the sum of the interper-
sonal scores among teammates is NP-Hard, and is too difficult to solve for
even a few dozen workers, depending on how sophisticated of a formulation
is used.
Beyond utility maximization, the economic concept of stability has played
a major role in similar types of preference-reporting mechanisms. In many
games, we ask if a subset of players could all improve their situation by
breaking away from the game and getting together by themselves. Such a
situation is called unstable, and is considered bad for morale or for the sur-
vivability of the game as an institution. Further, it encourages the subset
to collusively misstate their preferences to achieve the better outcome. (By
reporting maximum scores for those in the subset, and zero for all others,
group manipulation may often prove beneficial, undermining the goals of
the mechanism.) Some job markets (modeled as marriage markets, such
as medical-residency matching) have been shown in the classical literature
to always admit stable solutions, sometimes many. Other simple markets
may have no stable solution, such as in the stable roommate problem (which
can be modeled as our current problem with team-size s = nm = 2 and no
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constraints besides s = 2).
This leads us to consider the problem of finding a solution that minimizes
the amount that any subset (or coalition) of players could mutually improve
their situation by breaking away and forming a new valid team. We call
this the maximum uplift coalition, and consider the minimization of the
maximum uplift. When the minimum is zero, the solution is stable, but
even when no stable solution exists, the minimum provides a measure of
instability.
A restriction to equal-sized teams is used throughout this paper; other
constraints based on worker characteristics may or may not be included.
Since the case when m does not evenly divide n but team sizes as close as
possible to uniform are required can be modeled by adding dummy workers
and a constraint enforcing that at most one dummy worker is assigned per
team, we assume m evenly divides n throughout for simplicity. This (nearly-
)equal-size teams assumption is crucial, driving the interesting behavior of
this type of system (in contrast to hedonic games). With equal-size teams,
individual actions have less influence, making group uplift a more interesting
consideration than unilateral deviation.
After a broad review of the literature (§2), we provide a descriptive
model (§3) and then refine to a more usable single-level reformulation (§4).
We provide and then compare three algorithmic implementations (§5 and
§6) before comparing to benchmark heuristics from the literature (§7) across
four distinct preference models.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Team Dynamics
The study of interpersonal dynamics in teams has a huge stream of literature
within the management and organizational psychology community. Though
too deep to expound upon broadly here, Gardner et al. (2017), for exam-
ple, have considered formal models with quadratic objective terms based on
pairwise utility realized among those individuals placed in the same group.
See Mathieu et al. (2015) for a survey of the dynamics of people working in
teams and their influence on team formation. One perspective is that a team
planner will often have several practical constraints on acceptable teams, for
example that each team must include a minimum number of people from a
certain gender, ethnic group, or having a specific skill set (Campion et al.
1993). Moreover, several models and algorithms have been developed to
solve team partitioning problems that consider different forms of skill con-
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straints (Farhadi et al. 2011, Gutierrez et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2012, Agrawal
et al. 2014). These provide support for our constraint-based architecture,
with each team needing to satisfy quotas or caps on workers of particular
skill-sets or other generic binary characteristics.
2.2 Graph Theory
Maximizing only the intra-group efficiency for teams of equal size is equiva-
lent to the NP-hard balanced k-clique partitioning problem (BCPP) (Bhasker
and Samad 1991), which has been used, for example, for sports tournament
scheduling and league realignment (Recalde et al. 2016). This stream of
literature focuses only the efficiency of the solution, with no consideration
of stability.
2.3 Matching
With preferences submitted by self-interested agents, the current work is
related to an extensive literature on “matching markets” which has become
an active area of research with wide-spread applications. This work builds
on the classical stable marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) (see
also Gusfield and Irving 1989, Irving 1985, Iwama and Miyazaki 2008) in
which disjoint sets of men and women each rank members of the opposite
gender (possibly ranking “being alone” above some potential mates). A sta-
ble matching is often desired, in which no unmatched couple prefers each
other over their current matching. Applications of bipartite marriage-type
matching have flourished in recent years, with prominent successes in the
National Residency Matching Program (Roth 1996), school-choice programs
(Pais and Pinte´r 2008), and kidney exchange (Roth et al. 2004), and even
recognition of the discipline with the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sci-
ences. The tension between efficiency and stability (studied here) has been
present in this stream of research, particularly in discussions of school-choice
program implementations (Erdil and Ergin 2008).
2.3.1 Roommate Problem Variations
As mentioned in Section 1, when the market does not consist of two dis-
joint classes of agents (e.g., men and women, workers and jobs, students
and schools, etc.) but is instead drawn from a single pool of agents, a stable
solution may not exist, even with “teams” of size two and no further con-
straints, i.e., the roommate problem (Irving 1985). Indeed, team formation
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has already been discussed as a natural generalization of the roommate prob-
lem (Biro´ et al. 2016), but few have attempted to tackle all computational
difficulties directly.
While a particular instance of the (s = 2) roommate problem may not
admit a stable solution, a polynomial-time algorithm (Irving 1994) can check
for the existence of a stable solution and find one, if it exists. Prosser (2014)
present an alternative constraint-programming algorithm for this problem
with partially-defined preference lists. Partially-stable outcomes in unsolv-
able roommate problems (problems without stable matchings) have been
defined; for example, an almost stable matching consists of a Pareto-optimal
matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs; a maximum-internally
stable matching is a solution with a maximal set of stable pairs; and a maxi-
mum irreversible matching maximizes the number of stable pairs (Abraham
et al. 2006, Tan 1990, Biro´ et al. 2016). Also, Van der Linden et al. (2016)
recently explored an algorithm for the roommate problem in which people
who are mutual favorites, i.e., soulmates, are matched first, with the process
then iterated. To the best of knowledge of the authors, no formal study of
determining whether or not a stable assignment exists (and producing one if
it does exist) for s > 2 has previously been studied. Other generalizations of
stable roommate problems include those by Cechla´rova´ and Fleiner (2005),
where an agent may participate in more than one 2-person relationship.
Recently, Wolfson and Lin (2017) study ride-sharing as an application of
the roommate problem, proposing a heuristic algorithm for both efficiency
and stability, but again studying only the special case of our current setting
under s = 2.
It is worth noting here that much of the roommate and matching lit-
erature focuses on ordinal-preference elicitation (i.e., submission of ranked
lists) while we use cardinal-preference elicitation (i.e., submission of numer-
ical scores) for practical reasons. Because every cardinal submission can be
transformed uniquely to a weak ordinal preference, we ignore this distinction
for the remainder of the paper.
2.3.2 Hedonic Games
This paper focuses on team formation with a restriction to equal-sized teams,
unlike hedonic games (Aziz et al. 2011). Negative preferences in hedonic
games can result in agents not matched to teams, where here an equal-size
constraint prohibits this. We thus normalize preferences to be nonnegative.
Also of note is that a variety of stability concepts have been studied for
hedonic games, including Nash stability , individual stability , and contractual
6
individual stability , respectively considering the benefit of leaving a current
team and joining another team for each person of the market, for each person
and the team receiving a defector, and for each person, the receiving team,
and the team that was left (Aziz et al. 2011).
Research has been done on the complexity of verification, existence, and
calculation of solutions satisfying these notions of stability in hedonic games
(Sung and Dimitrov 2010), but the emphasis on individual deviations does
not shed much light on the difficult computational problems explored here.
The equal-size constraint forces us to consider group deviation directly. Be-
cause one individual cannot defect and join another team without impli-
cations for other teams, it is important to consider improvements resulting
from several trades taking place at once. Our notion of team uplift considers
the whole group of agents’ preferences in forming a hypothetical alternative
team. We consider individual deviation only in the appendix, showing that
it seems to be less interesting with equal-size teams.
2.4 Team Formation: Benchmarks from the Literature
The most closely related work to our own is that of Wright and Vorobeychik
(2015) who also explore mechanisms for team formation computationally. In
the Harvard Business School Draft (DRAFT), agents are randomly ordered
with the first m agents selected as captains. Over m − 1 rounds, each
captain in turn selects her most preferred unassigned member to join her
team, with the order reversing in even and odd numbered rounds. In the
One-Player-One-Pick (OPOP) mechanism, all agents are randomly ordered
with the first m captains starting a team with only one pick from among the
remaining non-captains. Then, each remaining non-captain in the ordering
chooses her favorite team based on expected utility. If her team has another
available spot, she also chooses the next person to join her team. Wright
and Vorobeychik (2015) provide evidence in favor of these two mechanisms,
making them the best benchmarks available for direct comparison in our
computational experiments.
3 The Team Formation Problem
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents with n = m · s and n,m, s ∈ Z+.
For each i 6= j ∈ N , let ui,j ∈ Z+ represent the pairwise utility of i for
being teamed with j, normalized to be non-negative and integer by affine
transformation, with all ui,i = 0. A feasible team formation is a partition
of N into m teams M = {1, . . . ,m}, denoted by t : N → M. Hence
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t(i) is the team agent i is assigned to, and the equal-size teams restriction
requires | {i ∈ N|t(i) = k} | = s for all k ∈M. We will use T to denote the
set of legal team formations, with the equal-size teams restriction assumed
throughout. Furthermore, let c(t, i) := {j : t(j) = t(i)} be the set of agents
assigned to the same team as i in t.
It will be convenient to search over size-s subsets of N without specifying
an entire team formation. Thus, let C := (Ns ) be the family of all subsets
of N (called coalitions) of size s. For any i, let C(i) ⊆ C be those coalitions
c with i ∈ c. For any c ∈ C(i), let u (c, i) := ∑j∈c ui,j signify i’s total
individual utility as part of c. As additional shorthand, we have u (t, i) :=
u (c(t, i), i) as i’s utility in a team formation and u (c) :=
∑
i∈c
∑
j∈c ui,j
as the utility of an entire coalition c. We define each agent i’s maximum
realizable utility U (i) := maxc∈C(i) u (c, i), which can be found by simply
taking the top s−1 values of ui,j (until later when other constraints beyond
equal-size are added).
As motivated above, we are interested in team formation with both total
utility (efficiency) and stability as objectives. Thus, our formal optimiza-
tion problem, the team formation problem (TFP) is formulated with both
objectives, weighted by a scalar α ∈ [0, 1] . The first component (weighted
by α) seeks to maximize the sum of the individual utilities. The second
component (weighted by 1 − α) seeks to minimize the maximum uplift r,
defined for any fixed t ∈ T by a maximum of
r(c, t) :=
∑
i∈c
(u (c, i)− u (t, i)) ,
over all coalitions c ∈ C with u (c, i) ≥ u (t, i) for all i ∈ c. The TFP is thus
modeled as:
max t∈T α ·
∑
i∈N
u (t, i)− (1− α) · r (TFP)
s.t. r = max
c∈C
{r(c, t) : (i ∈ c)→ (u (c, i) ≥ u (t, i))} .
The upper-level (leader) optimization model selects the partition and the
lower-level (follower) optimization model calculates the maximum uplift
coalition for the partition identified in the leader model. The condition
in the follower problem enforces that each individual in a maximum uplift
coalition is not worse off.
Note that if α = 1 we arrive at the BCPP, and if α = 0 then stability
(as measured by maximum uplift) is the only measure of interest. In the
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latter case, if the optimal solution is 0, then we have a fully stable solution;
if positive, we have a solution that minimizes the maximum uplift.
Optimization model (TFP) can be cast as a bi-level binary optimization
problem by introducing a binary variable xi,k indicating if each agent i is
placed in team k. We also associate, in the follower, variables yi, to indicate
if person i is selected in the maximum uplift coalition:
max α ·
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M
ui,jxi,k · xj,k − (1− α) · r (BL)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi,k = s, ∀k ∈M∑
k∈M
xi,k = 1, ∀i ∈ N
xi,k ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N ,∀k ∈M
r = max
{∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
ui,jyiyj −
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M
yiui,jxi,kxj,k
s.t. 0 ≤ (1− yi) · U (i) +
∑
j∈N
ui,jyiyj −
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M
yiui,jxi,kxj,k, ∀i ∈ N∑
i∈N
yi = s,
yi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N
}
.
Proposition 1. Model (BL) is a valid formulation for the TFP.
Proof. Leader problem constraints ensure a team formation, with total util-
ity weighted by α in the objective. We need only show that the follower
problem identifies the maximum uplift group.
Fix a solution to the leader problem x′. Let y′ be a feasible solu-
tion to the follower. By the constraint
∑
i∈N yi = s, a properly sized
coalition is identified. The first term in the follower objective function,∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N ui,jyiyj , is the total coalitional utility over every i with y
′
i = 1.
The second term evaluates to
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M y
′
iui,jx
′
i,kx
′
j,k. Therefore,
for a fixed i, y′iui,jx
′
i,kx
′
j,k will evaluate to 0 if y
′
i = 0, and to
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M ui,jx
′
i,kx
′
j,k
if y′i = 1. In the latter case, this term is the utility of i according to x
′ in
the leader problem. Therefore, the (1 − α) objective term evaluates to the
total uplift of the coalition defined y′i above the x
′ value.
Finally, the constraint 0 ≤ (1− yi)·U (i)+
∑
j∈N ui,jyiyj−
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈M yiui,jxi,kxj,k
becomes trivially satisfied if y′i = 0 (by the maximality of U (i)). If y′i = 1,
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the constraint enforces that each individual chosen must have an increase in
utility to want to join an uplift coalition, completing the proof. 
4 Single-level Reformulations
In order to design an efficient algorithm for solving (BL) (which is bi-level,
quadratically constrained and has a quadratic objective function), we trans-
form it into a single-level linear binary optimization model with the addition
of two new sets of binary variables. For every pair i, j ∈ N , let wi,j indicate
if i and j are assigned to the same team (if i = j let wi,j = 0, or simply ig-
nore it). Next, for every i and value v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,U (i)}, introduce variables
zi,v indicating if i has individual utility v in the team assigned to i:
max α ·
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
ui,jwi,j − (1− α) · r (SL)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi,k = s, ∀k ∈M∑
k∈M
xi,k = 1, ∀i ∈ N
wi,j ≥ xi,k + xj,k − 1, ∀i ∈ N ,∀j ∈ N , ∀k ∈M
wi,j + xi,k ≤ xj,k + 1, ∀i ∈ N ,∀j ∈ N , ∀k ∈M
U(i)∑
v=0
zi,v = 1, ∀i ∈ N
U(i)∑
v=0
v · zi,v =
∑
j∈N
ui,jwi,j , ∀i ∈ N
r ≥ u (c)−
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=0
v · zi,v −
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=u(c,i)+1
u (c) · zi,v, ∀c ∈ C
xi,k ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N ,∀k ∈M
wi,j ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , j ∈ N
zi,v ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N ,∀v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,U (i)} .
Theorem 1. Model (SL) is a valid formulation for the TFP.
Proof. The first four sets of constraints generate a partition and link the
x variables with the w variables. Note that the second constraint set is
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necessary to link the x and w variables, forcing there to be at least one k
for which wi,j is constrained to zero when i and j’s teams differ.
The constraints
∑U(i)
v=0 zi,v = 1 and
∑U(i)
v=0 v · zi,v =
∑
j∈N ui,jwi,j , define
the z variables, which select exactly one value from the domain of the agent’s
utility function and match it to the w variable’s generation of utility as the
sum of pairwise actualizations.
The final constraint set (aside from binary constraints) links the uplift
variable r to the uplift of each coalition. In particular, for every coalition
c, the first term on the right-hand side is the total utility for c. The second
term calculates, for each i in the coalition, the individual utility realized
in the team formation obtained endogenously (by x and hence w and z
variables). The third term ensures that the constraint does not restrict the
value of r unless it is an individually rational uplift group for all i ∈ c. That
is, if zi,v = 1 for a value v > u (c, i), then i would get more utility from
the endogenous team formation than from the potential coalition c, and so
would not join c. An active zi,v variable in the third term causes the entire
right-hand side to be non-positive, hence trivially satisfied; if even one agent
would not join c it is not considered as a stability threat.
Note that these constraints enforce r ≥ 0; for any group c in the solution
defined by x, the right-hand side evaluates to 0. With the coefficient of r
in the objective function non-positive, r will take the maximum value of
the right-hand sides over this constraint set. Any tight constraint from this
set corresponds to a maximum uplift coalition in the solution defined by x.

An alternative, exponentially sized model can be formulated, which pro-
vides a tighter linear relaxation, at the expense of model size. This is done
by creating a binary variable tc for every c ∈ C, indicating whether or not
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this coalition is part of the team formation.
max α ·
∑
c∈C
u (c) tc − (1− α) · r (EXP)
s.t.
∑
c∈C
tc = m,∑
c∈C(i)
tc = 1, ∀i ∈ N
wi,j =
∑
c∈C(i)∩C(j)
tc, ∀i ∈ N , j ∈ N , j 6= i
U(i)∑
v=0
zi,v = 1, ∀i ∈ N
U(i)∑
v=0
v · zi,v =
∑
j∈N
ui,jwi,j , ∀i ∈ N
r ≥ u (c)−
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=0
v · zi,v −
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=u(c,i)+1
u (c) · zi,v, ∀c ∈ C
wi,j ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , j ∈ N , j 6= i
zi,v ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N ,∀v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,U (i)}
tc ∈ {0, 1} ∀c ∈ C.
This model replaces the x variables with t variables to define the team
formation, and the x and w linking constraints with wi,j =
∑
c∈C(i)∩C(j) tc ,
linking t variables with w variables.
4.1 Characteristic Constraints
As noted in §2 diversity of skill-sets or types is a primary concern when
establishing teams. For example, a company may want teams with individ-
uals from diverse functional areas, with varying Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
scores (The Myers & Briggs Foundation 2018), or with different expertise.
With student teams, diversity with respect to gender, skills, or roles might
be desired.
In general we consider constraints of the form, “each team must have a
specified minimum (or maximum) number of agents with characteristic q.”
Formally, suppose that there are a set of characteristics Q that each individ-
ual will either possess of not. This is indicated by the binary parameter δi,q
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equal to 1 if and only if agent i has characteristic q. For each characteristic
q ∈ Q, there is a specified quotaq and capq, with 0 ≤ quotaq ≤ capq ≤ s,
establishing bounds on the number of individuals possessing each character-
istic that must be represented in each group.
These bounds are easily appended to the models above. For model with
x variables, namely models (BL) and (SL), add:
quotaq ≤
∑
i∈N
δi,qxi,k,≤ capq ∀q ∈ Q, ∀k ∈M
to enforce this condition. For (SL) and (EXP), with variables tc, we simply
refine C to contain only those groups c for which these conditions hold. Call
this set CQ.
5 Optimization Algorithms
The models (SL) and (EXP) are computationally challenging in practice.
Both contain, at a minimum, a pseudo-polynomial number of variables and
an exponential number of constraints. This requires the design of algorithms
capable of scaling to instances of practical size. We make use of branch-and-
bound search, as is typically employed for binary optimization problems,
with added routines for handling the exponentially sized portions of the
model.
This section provides a description of two optimization algorithms for
TFP, one designed to solve model (SL) and one for model (EXP). To begin,
we describe a class of optimization problems that will appear as subprob-
lems throughout these two primary algorithms. The cardinality-constrained
binary quadratic programming problem (CCBQP) is specified by an asym-
metric, not necessarily positive semi-definite, ν × ν matrix Q, and a value
K:
max χTQχ (CCBQP)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
χi = K
Aχ ≥ b
χi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ν} ,
where the additional linear constraint set Aχ ≥ b may be vacuous. Recent
literature has investigated effective computational models for solving various
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instance types of CCBQP problems. In particular, model 2 of Lima and
Grossmann (2017) proved most efficient in our experimental results (using
commercial IP solvers) over a wide-range of instances, and so our presented
results employ the following reformulation throughout. Introduce binary
variables ψi,j for every pair of indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . , ν} with i < j, and
reformulate (CCBQP) as follows:
max
ν∑
i=1
Qi,iχi +
ν−1∑
i=1
ν∑
j=i+1
(Qi,j +Qj,i)ψi,j (CCBQP*)
s.t.
ν∑
i=1
χi = K
ψi,j ≥ χi + χj − 1, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , ν} , i < j
ψi,j ≤ χi, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , ν} , i < j
ψi,j ≤ χj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , ν} , i < j
j−1∑
i=1
ψi,j +
ν∑
i=j+1
ψj,i = (K − 1)χj , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , ν}
Aχ ≥ b
χi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ν} .
We now describe three proposed algorithms for the TFP, each a branch-
and-bound algorithm utilitizing a model formulated in Section 4.
5.1 Branch and cut (BC)
BC is a branch-and-cut algorithm for solving model (SL). All computational
models for the TFP presented in this paper contain the family of uplift-
defining constraints:
r ≥ u (c)−
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=0
v · zi,v −
∑
i∈c
U(i)∑
v=u(c,i)+1
u (c) · zi,v, ∀c ∈ C. (UP(c))
As opposed to adding all UP(c) constraints at once, we propose a branch-
and-cut approach for finding constraints that might impact the optimal
solution. Namely, at each integer-search-tree node, an optimization prob-
lem is solved to identify if there exists any c ∈ C for which the c-indexed
constraint UP(c) is violated. If such a violated constraint exists, it is added
to the model and the branch-and-bound search continues.
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Proposition 2. At any integer search-tree node, for either (SL) or (EXP),
let r′ be the value of r and, ∀i ∈ N , let v′i be the unique second index for
which variable zi,v is 1. Let χ
∗ be the optimal solution to the following
problem, with optimal objective value r∗:
max
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
ui,jχiχj −
∑
i∈N
v′iχi (VC)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
χi = s∑
j∈N
ui,jχj ≥ v′i · χi, ∀i ∈ N
χi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N .
There exists a violated UP(c) constraint if and only if r∗ > r′. Furthermore,
if r∗ > r′, and c∗ := {i : χ∗i = 1}, then UP(c∗) is a violated constraint.
The proof of this proposition is immediate—the mathematical program
(VC) finds the group c∗ for which each individual has a non-decreasing
uplift (enforced by the constraints
∑
j∈N ui,jχj ≥ v′i · χi) corresponding to
the most-violated constraint. Model (VC) is a special case of the CCBQP
and so can be solved via model (CCBQP*). We note that if characteristic
constraints are considered they can be directly added to the mathematical
program in the statement of Proposition 2 by adding constraints:
quotaq ≤
∑
i∈N
δi,qχi,≤ capq,∀q ∈ Q.
Equipped with Proposition 2 we can formally describe our first proposed
algorithm BC, which solves model (SL) by branch-and-cut. Starting with
none of the constraints UP(c), a branch-and-bound search solves model (SL).
At any integer-search-tree node, the optimization model in Proposition 2 is
solved to find if there exists a violated constraint. If one exists, the con-
straint UP(c∗) is added to the model and the search continues. Otherwise,
the solution identified at the node is feasible, and a potentially improving
solution.
5.2 Branch-cut-and-price (BCP)
BCP is a branch-cut-and-price algorithm for solving (EXP). One simple
method, which we donote by EXP, is enumerating all of C (or CQ if caps or
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quotas are in use) and directly solving (EXP) using a state-of-the-art integer
programming solver. EXP has the obvious shortcoming of scalability—|C|
grows exponentially with the number of people, hence limiting the use in
practical application.
To address this shortcoming, we describe a branch-cut-and-price al-
gorithm, BCP, that generates variables and constraints dynamically, as
needed. Note that not only does model (EXP) contain an exponential num-
ber of variables and an exponential number of constraints, but there is a
family of constraints that contain exponentially many variables, requiring
particular care in implementation. We will interchangeably refer to the vari-
ables tc as variables or columns.
BCP is initialized by finding any set of coalitions C0 ⊆ C representing
a team formation. For any current active C′ ⊆ C, starting with C0, de-
fine the restricted master problem, RMP (C′), as exactly formulation (EXP)
with C replaced by C′, implying a restricted set of both tc columns and
UP(c) constraints. Let o∗(C′) denote the optimal value of RMP (C′), with
r∗(C′), t∗c(C′), and w∗i,j(C′) as the associated variables values at the particular
optimal solution. To isolate the efficiency component of the objective, let
u∗(C′) := o∗(C′)+(1−α)r∗(C′)α . Note that with C′ = C, all these values corre-
spond to the true optimal solution (of the unrestricted problem), in which
case we may drop the argument. For the linear relaxation of RMP (C′) (re-
placing each ∈ {0, 1} with ∈ [0, 1]), we denote the optimal value and solution
by adding carets (or hats)—for example, oˆ∗(C′) refers to the optimal value
of the linear relaxation of RMP (C′).
With C0 defined as a feasible team formation, RMP (C0) is feasible. Yet
o∗(C0) may not be a lower bound on o∗, nor will oˆ∗(C0) necessarily be an
upper bound on o∗. For the former, there may be additional constraints,
related to c /∈ C0, that restrict r to take a value higher than it does at the
solution. For the latter, there may be variables that needed to be added
that are members of an improving solution.
Fix C′ and consider the linear relaxation of RMP (C′). Let µ, σi, and κi,j
be the dual multipliers of the first three listed constraints at the optimal
value, defined on the appropriate indices. Theorem 2 establishes a condition
for which one can assert that oˆ∗(C′) is an upper bound on o∗, enabling an
exact branch-cut-and-price algorithm to be designed.
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Theorem 2. Let rc∗ be the optimal value to the following problem:
max
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
(ui,j − κi,j)χiχj −
∑
i∈N
σiχi − µ (RC)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
χi = s
χi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
If rc∗ ≤ 0 and the optimal value to (VC) is less than or equal to r∗(C′), then
oˆ∗(C′) is an upper bound of o∗.
Proof. We need only show that under the conditions of the theorem there
is no set of groups C˜ ⊃ C′ for which oˆ(C˜) > oˆ(C′). Let P ∗ be the problem
formed by adding to RMP (C′) any missing UP(c) constraints ∀c ∈ C but
keeping the index set C′ for tc columns. Given this set of columns defined
by C′, since the optimal value to RMP (C′) is less than or equal to r∗(C′), we
know that the optimal value of the LP relaxation of RMP (C′) is equivalent
to the optimal value of the LP relaxation of P ∗. We now show that, under
the conditions of the theorem, for any coalition c˜ /∈ C′, the reduced cost of
variable tc˜, if it were to be added to the variables in P
∗, is less than or equal
to 0. This implies that the LP relaxation of P ∗ is equal to oˆ∗(C), which in
turn implies oˆ∗(C′) = oˆ(C).
Fix c˜ /∈ C′. The reduced cost of tc˜ is
u (c˜)− µ−
∑
i∈c˜
σi −
∑
i∈c˜
∑
j∈c˜:j 6=i
κi,j =
∑
i∈c˜
∑
j∈c˜:j 6=i
(ui,j − κi,j)−
∑
i∈c˜
σi − µ.
By the conditions of the theorem,
∑
i∈c˜
∑
j∈c˜:j 6=i (ui,j − κi,j)−
∑
i∈c˜ σi−µ ≤
0. Since c˜ was arbitrarily chosen, this concludes the proof. 
Note that RC is another instance of the CCBQP.
Equipped with Theorem 2, BCP proceeds as follows. Starting from an
appropriate C0, we begin by iterating between finding improving columns,
and finding violating constraints. In particular, starting with C′ = C0 (RC)
(the pricing problem) is iteratively solved, and whenever an improving col-
umn is found (i.e., the optimal value is greater than 0), it is added to C′.
When the optimal value drops to 0, model (VC) is solved. If a violating
constraint is found, the coalition corresponding to that constraint is added
to C′, and, again, improving columns are identified. If, however, there are no
violating constraints, a global bound on the optimal value is found. One can
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then solve RMP (C′) with integrality constraints to arrive at a feasible, po-
tentially improving primal solution. This is done at every search-tree node,
as RMP (C′) can typically be solved effectively.
A branch-and-bound search is used to find the globally optimal solution.
In particular, after solving the root node of the search, by the procedure
described above, a variable is chosen to branch on. Two other nodes are
created, one in which the chosen variable is forced to 0 and the other forced
to 1. The procedure continues until all nodes are pruned, whereupon the best
found primal solution is the globally optimal solution to the original TFP
instance. In the case where characteristic considerations are incorporated,
one need only add constraints to the pricing problem limiting the choice of
additional columns.
More formally, a branch-and-bound search is implemented as follows.
Each search-tree node is specified by two coalitional sets: Cin and Cex. Coali-
tions c ∈ Cin are required to be a part of the solution and c ∈ Cex are forced
to be excluded from the solution, and not be generated in subsequent pricing
problems. The search-tree nodes are stored in a queue L. Initially, a root
node ρ contains Cin = Cex = ∅, a relaxation value o is assigned to ρ, and
L := {ρ}.
Once processing at a search-tree node concludes, a new search node ρ′ is
selected from L. The LP relaxation of (EXP) is found by solving RMP (C′)
with added constraints enforcing each c ∈ Cin to be in the solution (i.e.,
tc = 1) and that each c ∈ Cex is excluded (i.e., tc = 0). This is solved by
iteratively finding new columns to add to C′ via (RC) (adding constraints to
exclude any c ∈ Cex∪Cin by adding the constraint∑i∈c χi−∑i/∈c χi ≤ s−1),
and then finding the most violated constraint by (VC). By Theorem 2, if no
improving column and no violated constraint is found, the LP relaxation is
solved and a valid upper bound for the search node o′ is found.
If o′ is less than or equal to the value of the best known feasible solution,
the node is pruned and search continues. Otherwise, the master problem
RMP (C′) is solved with the integrality constraints included (along with
constraint enforcing group include/exclusion in Cin and Cex). If this solution
is the best known, it is recorded.
If o′ is still strictly larger than the value of the objective value of the best
known solution, two descendant nodes are created by selecting a coalition
c′ ∈ C′ for which 0 < tc′ < 1. In one node c′ is added to Cin and in the other
it is added to Cex.
If |L| = 0, the best known solution must be optimal.
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5.3 Implementation details
We implemented techniques BC, EXP, and BCP on an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4770 CPU @ 3.40GHz and 8 GB RAM, written in C++ and compiled with
GCC 4.8.4. IP models were solved with Gurobi 7.5.1. Unless otherwise
noted, the experiments below all use an 1800 second time limit. All instances
used in the experimental evaluation and MATLAB instance generators are
available upon request. Further details are as follows.
BC: solved by GUROBI with cuts (VC) identified via a callback. Through
preliminary experimentation, the following settings for GUROBI were found
most effective: PreCrush = 1; DualReductions = 0; LazyConstraints
= 1. Cuts UP(c) are found by solving (VC) with the reformulation into
model (CCBQP*).
EXP: solved by GUROBI with default setting via enumerating all of C.
BCP: solved by starting with an arbitrary solution (found by taking the
first s and putting them in one group, then the next s, etc.), and adding
these groups to C0. We then select 100 other random groups to add to C0
as follows. For each of these teams, we first select a random person. Then,
having selected a group g′ of size s′ < s, each unselected person j′ /∈ g′ is
assigned probability pg′(j
′) =
∑
i∈g′ ui,j′∑
i∈g′
∑
j /∈g′ ui,j
and is chosen to be the next
person added to g′ with probability p(j′). This process continues until a
group of size s is found and then that group is added to C0. This process is
repeated 100 times.
In the branch-and-bound search, the following algorithmic specifications
are set. Each pricing problem is solved by GUROBI with Cuts = 0 (this was
found most effective in preliminary computational results) using reformula-
tion CCBQP*. The nodes L are stored in a priority queue and the node
with the largest LP relaxation of the parent that created the node is selected.
The group with the most fractional tg′ is chosen to branch on.
6 Experimental Evaluation of EXP, BC, and BCP
Our results can be summarized as follows, with details provided in each
corresponding subsection:
• BCP tends to dominate EXP and BC on the number of instances
solved and optimality gap, though BC can at times provide an opti-
mality bound when the others cannot. (§6.2)
• Under BCP, larger umax values tend to result in more easily solved
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instances, despite a larger pseudo-polynomial formulation. (§6.3)
• The boundary values α ∈ {0, 1} result in inferior solutions and should
be avoided in favor of, for example, α ∈ {0.01, 0.99}. A small con-
sideration of efficiency finds more/better stable solutions in the same
amount of time, or conversely, a small consideration of stability finds
more stable solutions of equal efficiency with only a small amount of
additional computation. (§6.4)
• The type of characteristic constraints generated here have a signficant
impact on stability but an insignificant effect on total utility. If such
constraints are desired, Pareto improvments may often be available.
(§6.5)
Based on these results, the comparison of our own techniques to the
benchmarks from the literature (in §7) restricts attention to BCP with
α ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 0.99}.
6.1 Instance Generation
To explore the multidimensional parameter space, we focused on markets
of size (m, s) ∈ {(2, 4), (2, 12), (3, 8), (4, 2), (4, 4), (4, 6), (4, 8), (6, 4), (8, 4)},
including therefore instances with n ∈ {8, 16, 24, 32}. For each (m, s)-pair we
generate 20 instances (five for each of the four preference generation models
described below) using umax = 25. Further, for (m, s) = (6, 4) we also
generated twenty instances each for umax ∈ {5, 100}, for use in §6.3, a study
of the effect of the umax parameter. Finally for each these eleven market
parameter settings (nine with umax = 25 and one each with umax = 5, 100)
we also generate a parallel set of instances with three personal characteristics
(i.e., with |Q| = 3). This doubles the number of instances, resulting in 440
simulated markets, 220 each for |Q| ∈ {0, 3}.
To ensure feasibility when supplementing an instance with characteristic
constraints, δi,q values are determined by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
∑
i∈N
∑
q∈Q
wi,q · δi,q (FB)
s.t. quotaq ≤
∑
i∈N|t(i)=k
δi,q ≤ capq ∀q ∈ Q,∀k ∈M
δi,q ∈ {0, 1}
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For any values of wi,q, this model produces δi,q values so that at least one
valid team exists. For each instance, values wi,q ∼ U [−1, 1] are drawn
independently ∀i ∈ N and ∀q ∈ Q. This provides a random assignment of
all three personal binary charecteristics such that quotas and caps as defined
in §4.1 are always feasible.
Proceeding, each market is defined by ui,j values, which can be generated
randomly according to a preference generation model. Here we employ two
models from the literature (G1 and G3) and offer two new variants of our
own (G2 and G4).
Monotone Common-Value (G1): ui,j = j + i,j , where i,j ∼ N
(
0, n5
)
.
(Note that i,j is re-sampled until ui,j is a positive number.) This recreates
the generation procedure of Othman et al. (2010), with a common-value
component j (equal to the agent index) and a normally distributed private
deviation from the common baseline opinion of an agent’s value. (This may
simulate, for example, a sports draft where the relative order of players
does not vary much from one selecting team to the next, resulting in highly
correlated preferences.)
Clustered Common-Value (G2): ui,j = lj + i,j , where the common
value lj has four levels, lj ∈ {0, n/4, n/2, 3n/4} for four equal segments of
the market. The resulting preferences are similar to G1, but with a heavier
reliance on the private values to distinguish individuals. This models a
market with less extreme public agreement on the value of agents than G1.
Uniform independent preferences (G3): ui,j ∼ U {0, 100}, drawn in-
dependently from a discrete uniform distribution. For each agent, n − 1
numbers are chosen and sorted. Then, the differences between consecutive
draws, in sorted order, are used to describe the utility of person i for other
agents in the market (Wright and Vorobeychik 2015).
Affinity Preferences (G4): We designed this set of instances to model
settings in which the characteristics of agents affect their utilities. First,
characteristic sets are randomly generated based on model (FB). We assume
that the first two characteristics represent traits for which like agents tend
to have a natural affinity (e.g., age or gender) while the third characteristic
is viewed favorably by all (e.g., higher skill level). We therefore generate
ui,j = β1,iγi,j,1 + β2,iγi,j,2 + β3,iδj,3 + i,j , where binary γi,j,q = 1 and if and
only if δi,q = δj,q for q ∈ {1, 2}. Further, independently drawn personal
parameters β1,i, β2,i ∼ U [−1, 2], β3,i ∼ U [0, 2], and i,j ∼ N(0, 1) reflecting
that affinity effects are twice as likely to attract likes values as repel them
(and to varying degrees), and that characteristic 3 is always viewed favorably
but to varying dergrees.
In all four data-generation schemes, an n×n utility matrix U is generated
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution plot of performance, comparing the three
algorithms developed in this paper.
as above and then ipsative scores are generated by normalizing with respect
to the mean and standard deviation of the utility vector of agent i, then
rescaled and rounded to make utilities positive, integer, and no more than
umax (Baron 1996).
6.2 Optimality, Gap, and Computation Time Analysis
We compare the relative efficiency of EXP, BC, and BCP, running each of
the 220 unconstrained (i.e., |Q| = 0) market instances under α ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.5, 0.99, 1},
resulting in 1100 runs of each algorithm. Detailed solution statistics appear
in the Appendix, while Figure 1 depicts a cumulative distribution plot of
performance. For each algorithm, the left half provides a plot with height
equal to the cumulative number of instances solved at the time given on
the horizontal axis. In the right half, the height of the plot corresponds
to the number of remaining instances (unsolved at 1800s) with at most the
log absolute gap (i.e., log(UB − LB)) shown on the horizontal axis. As a
convention, we show an absolute gap of 100,000 (log of which is 5) for those
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Table 1: Number of instances solved in 1800 seconds by BCP and EXP
G1 G2 G3 G4
BCP 131 133 157 145
EXP 89 89 94 91
instances without a definite absolute gap (i.e., for EXP if memory limit is
hit and for BCP if no upper bound is proven, meaning the root node is
unresolved).
Figure 1 provides clear evidence of the superiority of BCP over EXP.
BC is the most robust, in that it can provide a gap for all instances tested,
being an entirely memory controlled procedure. However, both BCP and
EXP solve many more instances and leave a much smaller relative gap.
In summary, aggregated over these 1100 runs, BCP identifies a strictly
better solution (lower bound) than the other two algorithms in 420 instances,
and proves a strictly tighter relaxation bound (upper bound) in 344 in-
stances. In comparison, BC / EXP provide strictly best lower bound and
upper bound, respectively, in 36 / 57 and 71 / 43 instances. For those in-
stances solved to optimality by both BC and EXP, the solution times for
EXP are far superior and so we use EXP for the remaining comparisons
to BCP.
Figures 2 through 5 provide more detailed comparison of BCP and
EXP through scatter plots, one for each of the four generation schemes. In
particular, for each generation scheme, a scatter plot consisting of a point
per run (275 runs) with coordinates given by solution time of BCP and
EXP is depicted. The size of each point corresponds to the number of
agents in the instance. The color (gradient, from red to blue) corresponds
to the team size, s. The point style corresponds to the value of α, with axes
depicted in logscale.
These figures show that for the instances mutually solved, the solutions
times are in general comparable, but that there are many instances unsolved
by EXP that are solved by BCP, for all generations schemes. This is more
apparent for G3 and G4 than for G1 and G2, where BCP is able to
solve even more instances. Table 1 reports the number of instances solved
by BCP and EXP, respectively. This table suggests that EXP is only
slightly affected by the generation scheme, but that BCP is able to solve
significantly more instances for G3 and G4, which suggests that varying
degrees of common-value dependency makes instances more challenging.
The scatter plots also clearly exhibit that EXP is only superior to BCP
when the number of agents and the size of the groups are relatively small.
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Figure 2: Runtime for G1
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Figure 3: Runtime for G2
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Figure 4: Runtime for G3
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Figure 5: Runtime for G4
This coincides with expectations, since EXP is a precise model of the prob-
lem—however, as the problem size grows on any dimension, the application
of EXP becomes prohibitive due to either memory restrictions or, even
when memory limits are sufficient, resolution difficulty.
Based on the analysis in this subsection, we use the solutions obtained
by BCP for the subsequent analysis. Note that even if an upper bound
is not proven by BCP, a lower bound (i.e., high-quality feasible solution)
can still be obtained by solving for the best solution using the columns
generated. This contrasts with EXP, where, if the memory limit hits, no
feasible solution will be available.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution plot of performance, comparing BCP for
varying umax with m = 6 and s = 4.
6.3 The effect of umax
We next investigate the sensitivity of BCP to umax. Figure 6 provides a
cumulative distribution plot of performance for umax ∈ {5, 25, 100} on all
instances generated with m = 6 and s = 4. (Four preference models, each
with five instances and five values of α, result in 100 runs for each of three
umax values.)
The figure exhibits an interesting relationship. Parameter umax sets the
number of possible values that an agent can specify for the other individuals
in the market. Given more preference resolution/detail, it is slightly easier
to find the optimal solutions. Additionally, the absolute gap increases for
those instances that are unsolved. This can be attributed to either the
model becoming larger (as the size is directly related to umax) or that the
relative differences from solution to solution is smaller when umax is small.
The relative performance differences, however, are marginal, showing that
even though model (EXP) is pseudo-polynomial in umax, BCP is able to
scale for large preference ranges.
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6.4 Boundary effects on α
When considering the single-objective variants of the TFP, when only total
intra-group utility or stability, respectively, are of interest, a slight empha-
sis on the other objective leads to significant improvements. For α = 1,
maximizing utility only, a perturbation to α = 0.99 results in slightly longer
solution times but provides solutions with the same total utility but slightly
better stability. When α = 0, and one is concerned only with stability,
perturbing to α = 0.01 results in some solutions with even better stability
within time limits, due to computational efficiency gains.
Focusing first on the α = 1 case, we restrict attention to the 197 instances
(out of 220) solved to optimality by BCP with α = 1 and α = 0.99. For
every such instance, the total utility at the optimal solution is the same,
but the maximum uplift can be significantly different. In 26 of the instances
(13.2%) a better solution with respect to maximum uplift is identified, with
reduction in maximum uplift ranging from 3.84% to 100%, and an average
of 35.2%. For three instances in particular, the reported optimal solution
left a maximum uplift of 8, 11, and 13, respectively under α = 1, but with
α = 0.99, the reported optimal solution has the same total utility, but found
an entirely stable solution (i.e., maximum uplift = 0, a reduction of 100%).
This does come at a slight computational cost; the average solution time on
these instances is 118 (α = 1) and 147 (α = 0.99) seconds, respectively. This
added computational effort, however, is rewarded with solutions of strictly
better quality. This suggests, for example, that recent research using BCPP
(i.e., α = 1) in sports management (e.g., Recalde et al. 2016) may find
Pareto improved solutions using α = 0.99.
The difference in algorithmic performance is even more apparent when
comparing the solution quality and solution time under α = 0 versus α =
0.01. First, only 73 instances are solved to optimality with α = 0 versus 91
with α = 0.01. More critically, despite having a theoretically worse optimal
solution with respect to maximum uplift, in 131 of the 220 instances, BCP
identifies a solution with smaller uplift when α = 0.01 versus setting α = 0,
where the opposite occurs in only 3 instances. Furthermore, this reduction
is often substantial. The average percent reduction in maximum uplift in
the 131 instances where BCP found a solution with smaller maximum uplift
is 74.5%. In 59 of the 131 instances, the reduction is 100%, meaning that a
completely stable solution is found, whereas there are groups with positive
uplift in the solution found with α = 0 at 1800 seconds.
The reason for this surprising relative gain in solution quality can be at-
tributed to the fact that solutions with high total intra-group utility will have
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Figure 7: Average maximum uplift and average total market utility, with
and without characteristic constraints.
relatively low instability, compared with randomly chosen groups. Without
any consideration of total team utility in the objective function, it is chal-
lenging for the solver to distinguish between partitions of agents. Having a
slight emphasis on total intra-group utility focuses the search for solutions,
which turns out to be particularly effective under a column generation ap-
proach. BCP’s performance is only slightly hindered by the inclusion of
characteristic constraints; BCP is able to solve 668 and 637 instances with
and without characteristic constraints, respectively. Of the 617 instances
that mutually solved with and without the constraints, the average solution
time is 141.3 and 142.2 seconds, respectively, an insignificant difference.
6.5 The effect of characteristic constraints
Figure 7 provides a visual summary depicting the average of the maximum
uplift and total utility, respectively, in the best solutions obtained by BCP
with and without characteristic constraints. Clearly uplift is much more
sensitive to adding characteristic constraints than utility. Indeed, the change
in average utility is barely noticeable when constraints are added in any
case, compared with the maximum uplift, which rises drastically in several
market sizes, even more than doubling for some configurations. (Table 6 in
the Appendix provides further detail.) Market designers should take heed;
the addition of characteristic constraints may seem innocuous if only total
utility is considered, but actually it has the potential to introduce a great
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deal of instability.
7 Comparison of BCP to DRAFT and OPOP
Here we compare BCP (with different α) to DRAFT and OPOP on three
performance metrics: efficiency (measured by average individual utility), in-
equity (measured by the range of individual and team utility), and instability
(measured by individual and coalitional uplift). DRAFT and OPOP (see
§2.4) were not designed to handle characteristic constraints and may result
in infeasiblity if applied na¨ıvely. (A team may for example over-consume
a constrained characteristic, resulting in infeasbility for another team, even
if they conscientiously pick to maintain their own feasibility throughout.
Stated differently, given the NP-hardness of the problem, locally greedy al-
gorithms will fail to maintain global feasibility.) The results of this section
are therefore limited to an investigation of the |Q| = 0 subset of instances.
7.1 Efficiency
A clustered bar chart provides efficiency comparisons of BCP, DRAFT,
and OPOP in Figure 8. For each agent in each outcome, we divide agent i’s
resulting utility by i’s maximum realizable utility U (i). For each algorithm,
Figure 8 reports the average of this percentage utility over all solutions for
each generation scheme.
Our results show that BCP solutions have superior average utility across
all sets of instances. This superiority is more obvious for data generation
schemes with independent (G3) and affinity preferences (G4) and larger
α. (The latter is to be expected as the weight of efficiency in the objective
increases.) The significant common-value components of G1 and G2 result
in a larger degree of “necessary disappointment” in which it is impossible for
every agent to achieve her first best possible team. BCP tends to get closer
to maximum satisfaction with the outcome of the mechanism. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, even when the focus on efficiency is low (i.e., when α = 0.01) BCP
still provides more efficient solutions than the heuristic formats DRAFT
and OPOP.
7.2 Inequity
Intuitively, having some agents with very high utility while other agents
have very low utility can be problematic and viewed as inequitable or unfair.
This can be measured and compared on the individual level and on the team
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Figure 8: Average solution utility as a fraction of maximum realizable utility.
level. For percentage-based comparisons, we define the individual inequity
as the best individual utility minus the worst individual utility in a solution,
divided by the average of U (i). Similarly, we define the team inequity as the
best team utility minus the worst team utility in a solution divided by the
average ideal-team utility , defined for each i as the maximum utility of any
coalition including i. In Figure 9 we report the average individual inequity
and team inequity over all instances in each generation scheme for each of
the five algorithms. A taller bar indicates a worse solution on the measure
of inequity.
Clearly, the preference generation format can greatly impact the ranking
of mechanisms on this measure of allocative inequity. The left chart in Fig-
ure 9 indicates that for data generation schemes G3 and G4, the individual
inequity is typically smaller for BCP (regardless of α), and thus its re-
sults may be perceived as fairer. However, for data generation schemes with
stronger common-value effects (G1 and G2), only BCP with α = 0.99 re-
sults in more equitable solutions than those found by OPOP and DRAFT.
Indeed this relationship is among our more interesting findings; the focus
on stability (inherent as α decreases) results in less equitable solutions when
there is wide agreement on the “top of the market” as in G1 and G2. Stated
differently, in order to reduce the tendency of groups to want to break away
and form their own teams (when the focus is stability), one will have to
generate some teams with more “top” agents together, resulting in a wider
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Figure 9: Average inequity (percentage utility range), averaged over indi-
viduals (left) and teams (right).
satisfaction gap (inequity) in the market. This can only occur when the
underlying preferences reflect a certain degree of agreement on which agents
comprise the top of the market (e.g., in G1 and G2). When agents tend
to prefer to gather together based on their own affinity for those of similar
characteristics (G4), this effect is reduced, and it nearly disappears when
preferences are independent (G3).
This effect is even more pronounced in the right half of Figure 9. Our
results show that for data generation schemes with independent and affinity
preferences (G3 and G4), BCP with α = 0.99 achieves more equitable
teams than other algorithms. However, for data generation schemes G1
and G2, DRAFT achieves the the most equitable solutions across teams.
Note that BCP is not directly minimizing inequity, and in particular when
we focus only on minimizing the maximum uplift (α = 0.01), the team
inequity is more obvious. DRAFT tends toward teams of equal satisfaction,
spreading out “top picks” as would be expected; BCP with α = 0.01 tends
to allow “top picks” to clump together in order to reduce their desire to
leave the market.
7.3 Instability
To compare team formation outcomes across instances we again need a met-
ric scaled to 1. Let individual instability be defined as the maximum uplift
an agent can gain by defecting to a hypothetical uplift team, divided by her
utility within her current team. Team instability is the maximum uplift of a
team containing each i divided by the utility of her current team. These pro-
vide a relative measure of how much an individual or a team is incentivized
to defect given the current team assignment. Figure 10 provides two plots
depicting the average individual (left) and average coalition uplift (right),
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Figure 10: Average individual instability (left) and average team instability
(right)
averaged over all i.
These charts show that regardless of α, the solutions obtained by BCP
are more stable, having lower average and maximum individual uplifts.
Moreover, the average individual benefit of forming a coalition in the so-
lutions obtained by BCP with α = 0.01 is less than 4% of their current
benefit, while in OPOP and DRAFT, it can be on average as high as 30%
of their current benefit. Also, note that the maximum uplift is significantly
lower in data generation schemes G3 and G4 in comparison to data G1 and
G2. (Though not shown, the relative rankings do not change if we focus on
maximum uplift as oppopsed to average.)
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we investigate computational models for the team formation
problem. In order to balance intra-team utility with solution stability, we
formulated a bi-level binary optimization model and developed a branch-
cut-and-price solution algorithm. The pseudo-polynomial approach to the
bi-level problem is itself an interesting contribution, and we detailed how
to implement the resulting algorithm, which still has to manage an expo-
nential number of variables and constraints, demanding advanced computa-
tional methods, which we outline. Experimental results indicated that the
proposed algorithm BCP is particularly effective at finding high-quality
solutions quickly. Stability as an objective to be optimized over remains
a particularly challenging computational problem, but we have shown a
promising new approach.
Our results also indicate that ignoring stability can result in inferior so-
lutions when Pareto improvements are available. Because a defection-based
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measure of instability in this context points to opportunities for profitable
group deviation (i.e., strategic manipulation), these results will have prac-
tical implications. We showed that heuristic algorithms from the literature
may be leaving efficiency and stability gains on the table, as might have
been expected. Yet heuristics based on draft principles may be common
in practice; we would argue that this has much to do with the inherent
computational difficulty of optimization approaches, which we have shown
can be mitigated by algorithms like BCP. We have shown that our new
methods can improve total satisfaction, and improve incentives via reduced
instability measures.
While BCP with α = 0.99 performed very well on equity as a measure of
fairness, we found an interesting trade-off, in which the market maker must
in some cases accept inter-agent inequity in pursuit of stability (as α goes to
zero), in particular it would seem, where common value is the primary driver
of preferences. This discrepancy of inequity performance across preference
models proved interesting, and we expect future studies to shed more light
on how different models or descriptions of preferences affect the performance
of various algorithms for team formation.
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9 Appendix
Table 2 through Table 5 provide detailed solution statistics on G1, G2,
G3, and G4, respectively. The first four columns report the number of
agents, the number of groups, the maximum pairwise utility, and α. The
next three sets of four columns report solution statistics for EXP, BC, and
BCP, respectively. In particular, for each algorithm and each configuration,
we report the number of instances solved in 1800 seconds (ns), the average
solution time over those n2 instances (time), the number of instances that
have a provable optimality gap ng (i.e., for EXP the number of instances
that don’t hit memory limits and for BCP the number of instances for which
the root node was solved and an initial upper bound is proven), and finally
the average gap over those ng instances. The last two columns report the
average total utility (ubest) and maximum uplift (rbest) for the best solution
identified by BCP for that configuration.
Table 6 provides details on the effect of including characteristic con-
straints (considering only those instances with umax = 25). For each instance
configuration and for α ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 0.99}, the table reports, for the best so-
lution identified by BCP, the average uplift (r¯) and average total utility
(u¯) with and without characteristic constraints, for the instances from each
generation scheme, in sequence.
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Table 2: Detailed solution statistics for G1
EXP BC BCP
n m umax α ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ubest rbest
8 2 25 0 5 0.07 5 0 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.09 5 0 302 0
0.01 5 0.45 5 0 5 0.92 5 0 5 2.61 5 0 304.2 0
0.5 5 0.49 5 0 5 0.44 5 0 5 2.74 5 0 304.2 0
0.99 5 0.09 5 0 5 0.92 5 0 5 0.21 5 0 319 36.6
1 5 0.04 5 0 5 0.43 5 0 5 0.19 5 0 319 36.6
4 25 0 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.74 5 0 5 0.02 5 0 109 0
0.01 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.73 5 0 5 0.13 5 0 109 0
0.5 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.1 5 0 5 0.12 5 0 110.6 1
0.99 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.37 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 113.4 9.8
1 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.24 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 113.4 9.8
16 4 25 0 5 481.8 5 0 1 1607 5 23.2 0 - 5 20.4 612.8 20.4
0.01 5 391.9 5 0 0 - 5 16.48 1 832 5 3.51 633.4 3.4
0.5 5 528.2 5 0 0 - 5 216.1 1 831.7 5 4.39 651.8 12.8
0.99 5 4.05 5 0 0 - 5 371 5 4.42 5 0 666.6 47
1 5 0.62 5 0 0 - 5 346.8 5 3.83 5 0 666.6 47.6
24 2 25 0 0 - 0 - 5 0.22 5 0 5 1.14 5 0 3313 0
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 4.2 0 - 4 1.01 3313 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 225.3 0 - 3 47.61 3313 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 304.7 3 1346 3 0 3429 370.4
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 367.2 0 - 0 - 3429 370.4
3 25 0 0 - 0 - 5 0.29 5 0 5 0.69 5 0 2094 0
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 17.63 0 - 5 1.48 2094 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 864.1 0 - 5 73.76 2094 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1605 5 1124 5 0 2246 209.2
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1650 5 633.7 5 0 2246 209.2
4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 124.6 0 - 5 49.6 1487 49.6
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 114.1 0 - 5 45.56 1510 44.8
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 709.7 0 - 5 40.6 1625 75.8
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1283 5 228.8 5 0 1637 126.6
1 5 130 5 0 0 - 5 1289 5 184.1 5 0 1637 126.6
6 5 0 0 - 5 4.8 0 - 5 8.2 0 - 5 8.8 179.4 8.8
0.01 0 - 5 6.74 0 - 5 11.06 0 - 5 4.43 200.6 4.4
0.5 1 1122 5 1.2 0 - 5 86.3 0 - 5 2.77 209.6 7.2
0.99 5 27.35 5 0 0 - 5 160.7 5 50.38 5 0 210.6 9
1 5 1.67 5 0 0 - 5 160.2 5 17.98 5 0 210.6 10.4
25 0 0 - 5 42.2 0 - 5 63.8 0 - 5 33.2 903.6 33.2
0.01 0 - 5 31.32 0 - 5 49.34 0 - 5 20.35 999 20.4
0.5 0 - 5 20.9 0 - 5 363.9 0 - 5 16.3 1010 28.4
0.99 5 50.38 5 0 0 - 5 676.5 5 35.75 5 0 1022 56.2
1 5 4.99 5 0 0 - 5 681.8 5 31.1 5 0 1022 56.2
100 0 0 - 5 250.4 0 - 5 245 0 - 5 133.8 3620 133.8
0.01 0 - 5 131.1 0 - 5 217.9 0 - 5 69.01 3862 67.4
0.5 0 - 5 119.1 0 - 5 1565 0 - 5 74.54 4063 129.2
0.99 5 508.7 5 0 0 - 5 2881 5 107.4 5 0 4096 229.6
1 5 14.98 5 0 0 - 5 2899 5 82.16 5 0 4096 229.6
32 4 25 0 0 - 0 - 1 0.85 5 207.2 1 1.29 5 65 2777 65
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 172.1 0 - 0 - 2769 66.4
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1325 0 - 0 - 2984 171.4
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2413 0 - 0 - 3028 240.8
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2442 0 - 0 - 3028 233.4
8 25 0 0 - 5 63.6 0 - 5 65 0 - 5 41.6 1199 41.6
0.01 0 - 5 39.59 0 - 5 69.91 0 - 5 27.58 1298 27
0.5 0 - 5 30.3 0 - 5 550.2 0 - 5 25.56 1378 45.8
0.99 5 465.7 5 0 0 - 5 1024 5 164.7 5 0 1385 64.4
1 5 15.7 5 0 0 - 5 1036 5 109.5 5 0 1385 65.2
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Table 3: Detailed solution statistics for G2
EXP BC BCP
n m umax α ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ubest rbest
8 2 25 0 5 0.07 5 0 5 0.12 5 0 5 0.49 5 0 300.8 0
0.01 5 0.23 5 0 5 0.52 5 0 5 3.41 5 0 305 0
0.5 5 0.36 5 0 5 0.42 5 0 5 3.05 5 0 305 0
0.99 5 0.09 5 0 5 0.62 5 0 5 0.17 5 0 315.8 29.6
1 5 0.04 5 0 5 0.45 5 0 5 0.16 5 0 315.8 29.6
4 25 0 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.72 5 0 5 1.02 5 0 106.6 2
0.01 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.72 5 0 5 0.97 5 0 106.6 2
0.5 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.89 5 0 5 0.3 5 0 110.4 2.4
0.99 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.96 5 0 5 0.04 5 0 113.2 8.6
1 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.95 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 113.2 9.2
16 4 25 0 5 698.3 5 0 1 0.08 5 26.8 1 0.22 5 16.4 612.4 16.4
0.01 4 433.5 5 3.8 0 - 5 17.43 1 449.1 5 6.67 636.2 6.6
0.5 5 520.3 5 0 0 - 5 211.9 1 528.7 5 5.13 652.8 14
0.99 5 3.1 5 0 0 - 5 376.4 5 5.66 5 0 668 44.4
1 5 0.62 5 0 0 - 5 364.6 5 4.47 5 0 668 44.4
24 2 25 0 0 - 0 - 5 0.22 5 0 5 1.18 5 0 3305 0
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 4.43 0 - 2 0.95 3305 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 208.9 0 - 2 46.25 3305 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 367.3 1 1315 2 1.07 3419 369.6
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 355 0 - 0 - 3419 369.6
3 25 0 0 - 0 - 4 0.27 5 48.4 4 0.68 5 9.8 2101 9.8
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 29.77 0 - 5 19.67 2096 18.4
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 856.2 0 - 5 71.42 2124 27.6
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1633 5 834.5 5 0 2247 202.6
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1644 5 827.7 5 0 2247 202.6
4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 128.2 0 - 5 34.8 1502 34.8
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 105.2 0 - 4 35.59 1525 43.6
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 668.3 0 - 5 44.38 1622 74.8
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1200 5 301.8 5 0 1642 118
1 5 138.6 5 0 0 - 5 1223 5 172.3 5 0 1642 118
6 5 0 0 - 5 4 0 - 5 7.8 0 - 5 7.2 183.2 7.2
0.01 0 - 5 5.5 0 - 5 11.1 0 - 5 5.41 201 5.4
0.5 2 1462 5 1.8 0 - 5 71.1 0 - 5 2.85 208.6 6.8
0.99 5 27.31 5 0 0 - 5 129.4 5 39.32 5 0 210.2 9.8
1 5 1.48 5 0 0 - 5 130.8 5 15.19 5 0 210.2 11.8
25 0 0 - 5 37.6 0 - 5 61.8 0 - 5 39 904 39
0.01 0 - 5 32.72 0 - 5 54.94 0 - 5 22.39 969.4 22.2
0.5 0 - 5 21.9 0 - 5 366.2 0 - 5 18.33 1010 37.4
0.99 5 56.24 5 0 0 - 5 673.6 5 45.67 5 0 1017 58.4
1 5 4.67 5 0 0 - 5 684.2 5 27.76 5 0 1017 63.6
100 0 0 - 5 229.8 0 - 5 252 0 - 5 133.6 3673 133.6
0.01 0 - 5 134.6 0 - 5 230.1 0 - 5 83.74 3964 83.4
0.5 0 - 5 104.3 0 - 5 1616 0 - 5 76.22 4074 144
0.99 5 150.7 5 0 0 - 5 2960 5 90.41 5 0 4098 218.2
1 5 14.22 5 0 0 - 5 2929 5 50.88 5 0 4098 218.2
32 4 25 0 0 - 0 - 3 0.85 5 92.8 3 1.39 5 21.6 2792 21.6
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 107.2 0 - 0 - 2792 21.6
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1294 0 - 0 - 2963 172
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2418 0 - 0 - 3011 247.4
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2434 0 - 0 - 3019 236.4
8 25 0 0 - 5 65.8 0 - 5 59.2 0 - 5 39.4 1211 39.4
0.01 0 - 5 40.79 0 - 5 75.04 0 - 5 22.3 1317 21.8
0.5 0 - 5 31.8 0 - 5 527.6 0 - 5 22 1376 34.8
0.99 5 594.2 5 0 0 - 5 954.2 5 129.2 5 0 1389 64
1 5 15.15 5 0 0 - 5 971.8 5 105.2 5 0 1389 64
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Table 4: Detailed solution statistics for G3
EXP BC BCP
n m umax α ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ubest rbest
8 2 25 0 5 0.29 5 0 5 1.26 5 0 5 0.35 5 0 325.2 0
0.01 5 0.09 5 0 5 1.16 5 0 5 0.16 5 0 329.8 0
0.5 5 0.09 5 0 5 0.75 5 0 5 0.16 5 0 329.8 0
0.99 5 0.09 5 0 5 0.98 5 0 5 0.16 5 0 330 2.8
1 5 0.04 5 0 5 0.94 5 0 5 0.17 5 0 330 2.8
4 25 0 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.97 5 0 5 0.13 5 0 126.6 1
0.01 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.96 5 0 5 0.2 5 0 126.6 1
0.5 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.1 5 0 5 0.08 5 0 127.8 1.6
0.99 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.31 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 128.8 4
1 5 0.01 5 0 5 1.47 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 128.8 6.6
16 4 25 0 2 832.6 5 7.6 0 - 5 27.8 3 327.8 5 7 679.4 7
0.01 5 134 5 0 0 - 5 5.1 5 36.74 5 0 713.4 0
0.5 5 39.15 5 0 0 - 5 213 5 28.86 5 0 718 4.6
0.99 5 3.29 5 0 0 - 5 439.2 5 2.32 5 0 720.8 11.6
1 5 0.71 5 0 0 - 5 413.8 5 2.03 5 0 720.8 11.6
24 2 25 0 0 - 0 - 4 92.82 5 19.8 5 309 5 0 3382 0
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 4.11 4 585.2 4 0 3516 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 1 1561 5 135 4 418 4 0 3516 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 1 1706 5 218.6 4 428.6 4 0 3516 0
1 0 - 0 - 2 1459 5 215.2 4 432.6 4 0 3516 0
3 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 113.4 0 - 5 86.6 2186 86.6
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 63.1 5 112.8 5 0 2347 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 946.5 5 114.7 5 0 2347 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1829 5 115.7 5 0 2347 0
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1878 5 114.2 5 0 2347 0
4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 85 0 - 5 72.2 1584 72.2
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 65.9 5 61.93 5 0 1756 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 698.3 5 56.21 5 0 1756 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1322 5 39.82 5 0 1757 6.6
1 5 131.2 5 0 0 - 5 1336 5 45.35 5 0 1757 6.6
6 5 0 0 - 5 7.4 0 - 5 7.2 0 - 5 8.4 197 8.4
0.01 0 - 5 2.37 0 - 5 8.66 0 - 5 1.19 224.6 1.2
0.5 5 215.1 5 0 0 - 5 79.4 5 601.9 5 0 229 3.2
0.99 5 12.81 5 0 0 - 5 148.8 5 13.55 5 0 229.8 5.4
1 5 1.46 5 0 0 - 5 151.4 5 8.43 5 0 229.8 6
25 0 0 - 5 40 0 - 5 52.4 0 - 5 42.6 955 42.6
0.01 2 833.7 5 5.76 0 - 5 44.14 5 543.8 5 0 1118 0
0.5 4 746.6 5 0.4 0 - 5 415 5 184.2 5 0 1125 4.2
0.99 5 58.2 5 0 0 - 5 756.8 5 27.27 5 0 1128 25.6
1 5 4.87 5 0 0 - 5 772.6 5 15.77 5 0 1128 25.8
100 0 0 - 5 239.4 0 - 5 217.6 0 - 5 178.2 3840 178.2
0.01 2 88.69 5 38.18 0 - 5 197.2 5 241.4 5 0 4489 0
0.5 2 75.23 3 4.33 0 - 5 1724 5 195.1 5 0 4489 0
0.99 5 121.4 5 0 0 - 5 3195 5 41.02 5 0 4503 54.6
1 5 15.76 5 0 0 - 5 3187 5 34.15 5 0 4503 58.6
32 4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 127.6 0 - 5 127.8 2869 127.8
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 128.6 3 921.6 5 0.02 3204 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1371 4 976.8 5 0.33 3205 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2610 5 980.2 5 0 3208 16.4
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2623 4 669.6 5 0.31 3208 23.4
8 25 0 0 - 5 56.8 0 - 5 63.6 0 - 5 60 1228 60
0.01 0 - 5 18.65 0 - 5 67.79 0 - 5 1.19 1530 1
0.5 1 1244 5 7.5 0 - 5 568.8 2 868.6 5 1.57 1550 12.6
0.99 5 210 5 0 0 - 5 1089 5 68.13 5 0 1554 20.6
1 5 15.06 5 0 0 - 5 1084 5 55.95 5 0 1554 27
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Table 5: Detailed solution statistics for G4
EXP BC BCP
n m umax α ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ns time ng gap ubest rbest
8 2 25 0 5 0.19 5 0 5 1.29 5 0 5 0.36 5 0 324.6 0
0.01 5 0.09 5 0 5 0.78 5 0 5 0.37 5 0 332.2 0
0.5 5 0.11 5 0 5 0.39 5 0 5 0.35 5 0 332.2 0
0.99 5 0.08 5 0 5 0.46 5 0 5 0.16 5 0 335.8 7.4
1 5 0.04 5 0 5 0.59 5 0 5 0.19 5 0 335.8 7.4
4 25 0 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.51 5 0 5 0.3 5 0 121.6 0.6
0.01 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.47 5 0 5 0.28 5 0 121.6 0.6
0.5 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.48 5 0 5 0.06 5 0 124.8 1.6
0.99 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.41 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 124.8 1.6
1 5 0.01 5 0 5 0.38 5 0 5 0.03 5 0 124.8 5.4
16 4 25 0 5 600.2 5 0 0 - 5 35.4 0 - 5 32.4 653 32.4
0.01 5 219.9 5 0 0 - 5 12.19 5 413.6 5 0 704 0
0.5 5 38.45 5 0 0 - 5 154.7 5 71.4 5 0 710.4 1.6
0.99 5 4.35 5 0 0 - 5 283.3 5 3.35 5 0 723.2 21.8
1 5 0.64 5 0 0 - 5 276.2 5 3.18 5 0 723.2 21.8
24 2 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 224 1 383.4 5 148.2 3397 148.2
0.01 0 - 0 - 2 1344 5 5.56 4 388.8 4 0 3678 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 4 1068 5 28.4 5 372.5 5 0 3678 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 5 1024 5 0 4 324.8 4 0 3680 10.4
1 0 - 0 - 5 973.1 5 0 5 329.2 5 0 3680 10.4
3 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 185.2 0 - 5 143.2 2159 143.2
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 108.3 4 225.2 5 0 2452 0
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 806.1 4 219.9 5 0.12 2452 0
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1429 5 255.6 5 0 2462 35.6
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1536 5 79.09 5 0 2462 35.6
4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 115.4 0 - 5 100 1557 100
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 93.32 3 240.8 5 5.63 1777 5.6
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 567.3 3 201.7 5 3.78 1785 6.8
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1019 5 64.81 5 0 1797 43.8
1 5 141.9 5 0 0 - 5 1021 5 73.92 5 0 1797 51.8
6 5 0 0 - 5 5.6 0 - 5 8.2 0 - 5 9.4 192.8 9.4
0.01 1 1657 5 3.15 0 - 5 9.26 0 - 5 2.77 221.4 2.8
0.5 5 168.3 5 0 0 - 5 58.2 3 712.9 5 0.13 225.6 4.4
0.99 5 22.44 5 0 0 - 5 111.4 5 25.75 5 0 225.6 4.4
1 5 1.55 5 0 0 - 5 105.8 5 16.26 5 0 225.6 5.6
25 0 0 - 5 53.8 0 - 5 61.4 0 - 5 52.2 959.8 52.2
0.01 0 - 5 17.91 0 - 5 59.87 0 - 5 9.96 1087 9.8
0.5 1 1769 5 6.5 0 - 5 345.1 0 - 5 4.35 1120 21.2
0.99 5 39.38 5 0 0 - 5 618.7 5 39.06 5 0 1125 33.4
1 5 4.94 5 0 0 - 5 635.6 5 30.87 5 0 1125 36
100 0 0 - 5 258 0 - 5 254.6 0 - 5 204.4 3955 204.4
0.01 0 - 5 89.05 0 - 5 237.3 0 - 5 6.59 4456 6
0.5 0 - 4 35.75 0 - 5 1397 1 1232 5 11.38 4507 27.2
0.99 5 124.3 5 0 0 - 5 2506 5 88.97 5 0 4540 105.2
1 5 14.06 5 0 0 - 5 2563 5 106.9 5 0 4540 105.2
32 4 25 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 223.6 0 - 5 182.4 2908 182.4
0.01 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 195.6 1 914.8 5 46.71 3329 47
0.5 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 1238 1 1423 5 25.34 3338 42.6
0.99 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2317 5 437.2 5 0 3356 95.8
1 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 2316 5 508.4 5 0 3356 95.8
8 25 0 0 - 5 62.6 0 - 5 67.6 0 - 5 62.2 1256 62.2
0.01 0 - 5 23.44 0 - 5 72.39 0 - 5 13.42 1482 13.2
0.5 0 - 5 15.2 0 - 5 519.8 0 - 5 8.75 1515 20.4
0.99 5 216.1 5 0 0 - 5 918 5 113.8 5 0 1519 32.4
1 5 15.17 5 0 0 - 5 943.6 5 110.5 5 0 1519 33.8
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